Title X: Investigate The Assassination

Trust in institutions is low, and voters deserve to have their concerns addressed. Regarding the public assassination of a powerful figure in grassroots politics, an investigation into verified claims published in mainstream outlets about donor pressure related to political positions and the potentially illegal activities of a 501(c)3 nonprofit participating in electoral activities, it is worthwhile to have such circumstances addressed. Read the full bill title below.

TITLE X of The MAD Act

ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY IN POLITICAL VIOLENCE INVESTIGATIONS

SEC. 10001. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This title may be cited as the "Investigate the Assassination Act".

(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents of this title is as follows:

Sec. 10001. Short title; table of contents.

Sec. 10002. Findings.

Sec. 10003. Purpose.

Sec. 10004. Establishment of the National Commission on the Assassination of Charlie Kirk.

Sec. 10005. Scope of inquiry.

Sec. 10006. Powers of the Commission.

Sec. 10007. Staff, compensation, and funding.

Sec. 10008. Report.

Sec. 10009. Termination.

Sec. 10010. Severability.

SEC. 10002. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:

(1) On September 10, 2025, Charles J. Kirk, the founder and CEO of Turning Point USA (hereinafter "TPUSA"), was assassinated by an alleged gunshot to the neck while he was speaking at a public event at Utah Valley University in Orem, Utah, before an audience of approximately 3,000 people.

(2) Tyler James Robinson, age 22, of Washington, Utah, has been charged with aggravated murder and faces the death penalty. The case remains in pretrial proceedings and Mr. Robinson has not yet entered a plea, and is therefore presumed innocent.

(3) TPUSA reports a presence at approximately 3,500 campuses (although this has been contested as of late through investigative reporting), including roughly 900 college chapters and 1,200 high school chapters, employs a field staff in excess of 450, and reported annual revenues of approximately $85,000,000 for the fiscal year ending in 2024, making it one of the most influential political organizations in the United States.

(4) The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives released a ballistics report stating they were unable to identify the bullet recovered during autopsy as having been fired from the rifle attributed to the sole charged suspect, a result the report characterized as inconclusive. A second comparative analysis and a bullet lead composition analysis by the Federal Bureau of Investigation were, as of the most recent filings, still pending.

(5) Text message communications released by federal authorities, and cited in court filings as evidence of motive, did not include timestamps, which is an omission noted by the Associated Press and subject to bipartisan criticism.

(6) Within approximately one week of the assassination, the physical location of the crime scene at Utah Valley University (including the ground where Kirk fell) was excavated and permanently replaced with bricks and pavers, notwithstanding the pendency of an active capital murder investigation. Furthermore, no public explanation for this alteration has been provided, nor has it been confirmed whether law enforcement authorized or objected to this action.

(7) Multiple news organizations, including the New York Times, have reported that Kirk was subjected to documented financial pressure from major donors in the months and weeks preceding his death, including the reported cancellation of a $2,000,000 donation over a dispute regarding programming. These pressures were reported to be tied to his public and private positions regarding United States policy toward Israel. The authenticity of certain related private communications was confirmed by a spokesman for TPUSA.

(8) A former Director of the National Counterterrorism Center has publicly stated that his office was directed to cease investigating potential foreign connections to the assassination and that the investigation was routed exclusively to state authorities despite the objections of counterterrorism officials.

(9) TPUSA operates alongside multiple affiliated tax-exempt entities. Public reporting and the organization's own tax filings reflect material grants and transfers among these related entities, several of which operate from the same office. The structure of, and the flow of funds among, TPUSA and its affiliated entities warrant examination to ensure that charitable funds are used in a manner consistent with the requirements of their tax-exempt status.

(10) The assassination of a major American political figure at a public event constitutes a matter of extreme public concern. The integrity of the investigation and the completeness of the evidentiary record are matters properly subject to congressional oversight, without prejudice to the criminal proceedings against Mr. Robinson or any other person.

(11) The backgrounds, prior professional affiliations, and institutional histories of individuals in the immediate personal and professional circle of Kirk—including his family members, organizational officers, staff, and directors, as well as persons with regular access to Kirk's schedule, security arrangements, and private communications—have not, to the knowledge of Congress, been examined or disclosed as part of any Federal or State investigation, notwithstanding established investigative practice in cases of political assassination requiring such examination as a matter of course.

(12) In the months following the assassination, the absence of a comprehensive and publicly accountable investigation has given rise to widespread speculation, including unsubstantiated conspiracy theories across media platforms and among the general public. Such speculation, however understandable given the unresolved questions identified herein, risks undermining public confidence in the integrity of law enforcement and the administration of justice. A formal, independent congressional inquiry, conducted transparently and pursuant to subpoena authority, is necessary to establish an authoritative factual record and to displace conjecture with evidence, which would therefore assure the public that the circumstances have been examined with the rigor and completeness that this grave matter demands.

SEC. 10003. PURPOSE.

It is the purpose of this title to—

(1) establish an independent, bipartisan commission to examine the circumstances surrounding the assassination of Charlie Kirk including communications with donors and immediate connections preceding the assassination incident;

(2) determine whether the investigation was conducted with appropriate scope, rigor, and independence, including whether any agency or official was improperly curtailed, or the scope of their inquiry was narrowed, or asked to be abandoned;

(3) examine whether there was any foreign financial influence on any domestic political organizations or their leadership which may have contributed to a climate of coercion or intimidation relevant to the assassination;

(4) review the integrity and completeness of forensic and documentary evidence in the case; and

(5) make recommendations to Congress regarding legislative reforms which may curb political violence and stop the foreign financial coercion of domestic political leaders.

SEC. 10004. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE ASSASSINATION OF CHARLIE KIRK.

(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established in the legislative branch, the National Commission on the Assassination of Charlie Kirk (hereinafter in this title referred to as the "Commission").

(b) COMPOSITION.—

(1) The Commission shall be composed of 15 members, of whom—

(A) 1 member, who shall serve as Chairperson of the Commission, and who shall have no less than 7 years of experience in the administration of justice, including service as a judge, prosecutor, or senior court administrator, shall be appointed by the Chief Justice of the United States;

(B) 3 members shall be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of whom—

(i) 1 shall have not less than 7 years of experience as a sworn Federal, State, or local law enforcement officer, of which not less than 4 years shall have been in a supervisory or investigative capacity;

(ii) 1 shall have not less than 7 years of experience in forensic science, including expertise in one or more of ballistic analysis, DNA analysis, or crime scene reconstruction; and

(iii) 1 shall have not less than 7 years of experience in the governance, financial oversight, or regulatory compliance of tax-exempt organizations;

(C) 3 members shall be appointed by the minority leader of the House of Representatives, of whom—

(i) 1 shall have not less than 7 years of experience as a sworn Federal, State, or local law enforcement officer, of which not less than 4 years shall have been in a supervisory or investigative capacity;

(ii) 1 shall have not less than 7 years of experience as a licensed private investigator or in private investigative work conducted in support of civil or criminal litigation; and

(iii) 1 shall have not less than 7 years of experience in the intelligence community (as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003));

(D) 3 members shall be appointed by the majority leader of the Senate, of whom—

(i) 1 shall have not less than 7 years of experience in forensic science, including expertise in one or more of ballistic analysis, DNA analysis, or crime scene reconstruction;

(ii) 1 shall have not less than 7 years of experience as a sworn Federal, State, or local law enforcement officer, of which not less than 5 years shall have been in a supervisory or investigative capacity; and

(iii) 1 shall have not less than 7 years of experience in counterterrorism policy, analysis, or operations at a Federal department or agency, the Armed Forces, or a congressional committee of jurisdiction;

(E) 3 members shall be appointed by the minority leader of the Senate, of whom—

(i) 1 shall have not less than 10 years of experience in campaign finance law;

(ii) 1 shall have not less than 7 years of experience in the administration of justice, including service as a judge, prosecutor, or senior court administrator; and

(iii) 1 shall have not less than 7 years of experience in counterterrorism policy, analysis, or operations at a Federal department or agency, the Armed Forces, or a congressional committee of jurisdiction; and

(F) 2 members shall be appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate, of whom—

(i) 1 shall have not less than 7 years of experience in the intelligence community (as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)); and

(ii) 1 shall have not less than 10 years of experience in national security policy at the National Security Council, the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, or a congressional committee of jurisdiction.

(2) CHAIRPERSON AND VICE CHAIRPERSON.—The member appointed under paragraph (1)(A) shall serve as Chairperson of the Commission. Not later than 30 days after the date on which all members have been appointed, the members of the Commission shall, by majority vote, elect a Vice Chairperson from among themselves.

(3) Members shall be appointed not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this title.

(4) No member of the Commission shall have been, at any time during the 5-year period preceding appointment, an officer, employee, contractor, or registered lobbyist of TPUSA or any of its affiliated entities, or a donor of record to any such entity.

(5) No member of the Commission shall, at the time of appointment or at any time on or after January 1, 2026, be employed as a Senate-confirmed officer, a non-career member of the Senior Executive Service, or a commissioned officer in the Executive Office of the President, at any executive branch department or agency whose conduct, policies, or decisions fall within the scope of inquiry described in section 10005.

(6) Any vacancy on the Commission shall not affect the powers of the Commission and shall be filled in the same manner in which the original appointment was made, not later than 30 days after the date on which the vacancy occurs.

(7) QUORUM; MEETINGS.—Eight members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum. The Commission shall hold its first meeting not later than 30 days after the date on which all members have been appointed, and shall meet not less frequently than once per month thereafter until the termination of the Commission under section 10009. The Chairperson may convene additional meetings of the Commission as the Chairperson considers necessary.

SEC. 10005. SCOPE OF INQUIRY.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Commission shall investigate and report on the following:

(1) FORENSIC AND EVIDENTIARY INTEGRITY.—Whether the forensic evidence in the case, including ballistic analysis, DNA evidence, digital communications, and crime scene documentation, has been collected, preserved, analyzed, and disclosed in a manner consistent with best practices for capital murder investigations (which are still ongoing), and whether any material exculpatory or inculpatory evidence has been withheld, lost, or destroyed, with respect to what information is accessible.

(2) CRIME SCENE PRESERVATION.—The circumstances under which the physical crime scene at Utah Valley University was materially altered within days of the assassination, including the identity of the person or entity that authorized or performed such alteration and whether any law enforcement agency authorized, requested, or objected to such action.

(3) SCOPE OF INVESTIGATION.—Whether any Federal agency, including but not limited to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the National Counterterrorism Center, or any component of the intelligence community, was directed or pressured to narrow, curtail, or cease any line of inquiry related to the assassination, including but not limited to any inquiry into potential foreign connections, and, if so, the identity and authority of any official who issued such direction.

(4) FOREIGN FINANCIAL INFLUENCE.—The nature, scope, and source of any financial pressure, inducement, or coercion directed at Charlie Kirk or other members of TPUSA by domestic and foreign persons in connection with the organization's public positions on matters of foreign policy, especially on the topic of Israel, Gaza, and Iran, including—

(A) the withdrawal or threatened withdrawal of donations or financial support;

(B) demands to alter organizational programming, staffing, or public positions as a condition of continued financial support;

(C) communications between Kirk or TPUSA leadership and any foreign head of state, government official, or agent thereof, during the 12-month period preceding the assassination;

(D) the role, if any, of donor-advised funds, dark money vehicles, or other intermediary mechanisms in obscuring the ultimate source of financial pressure; and

(E) the personal financial relationships, professional histories, and any institutional affiliations of individuals in organizational leadership and in Kirk's immediate household, to the extent relevant to determining whether any such individual served as a channel for, or was subject to, foreign financial influence or coercion directed at Kirk or the organization.

(5) ORGANIZATIONAL FINANCES.—The financial operations of TPUSA and its affiliated entities, including intercompany transfers, employee headcount changes, payroll anomalies, other roles of TPUSA staff on boards in other companies, and the public availability of required disclosures, with particular attention to any transactions or restructuring occurring in the 12-month period preceding and the 6-month period following the assassination.

(6) PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS.—Whether any individual who maintained significant personal or professional access to Charlie Kirk during the 24-month period preceding the assassination—including but not limited to family members, cohabitants, organizational officers, directors, senior employees, and persons involved in Kirk's security, travel, or scheduling—

(A) maintained, at any time, any affiliation with, employment by, or contractual or informal relationship with any component of the intelligence community (as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)), any foreign intelligence or security service, or any entity acting as an intermediary for such a component or service;

(B) received any payment, benefit, credential, or nonpublic information from any such component, service, or intermediary entity;

(C) had prior knowledge of any threat to Kirk's safety that was not communicated to Kirk or to law enforcement; or

(D) took any action, or failed to take any action, with respect to Kirk's security arrangements, public schedule, or physical positioning at the event of September 10, 2025, that materially affected Kirk's exposure to risk.

(7) ADDITIONAL MATTERS.—Any other circumstances or evidence that the Commission determines to be relevant to a full and complete understanding of the assassination and the adequacy of the investigation thereof.

(b) LIMITATION.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize the Commission to interfere with, direct, or make findings as to the guilt or innocence of any person charged in connection with the assassination. The Commission shall take reasonable steps to avoid prejudicing any pending criminal proceeding.

SEC. 10006. POWERS OF THE COMMISSION.

(a) HEARINGS AND EVIDENCE.—The Commission shall, for the purpose of carrying out this title, hold no less than 2 publicized hearings to take such testimony, receive such evidence, and administer such oaths as the Commission considers advisable.

(b) SUBPOENA POWER.—

(1) The Commission may issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of any evidence, including books, records, correspondence, memoranda, documents, papers, and other material, relating to any matter under investigation by the Commission.

(2) Subpoenas shall be issued under the joint signature of the Chairperson and Vice Chairperson, or, in the event of disagreement, by a vote of not fewer than 6 members.

(3) In the case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia may issue an order requiring compliance.

(c) ACCESS TO INFORMATION.—

(1) The Commission may secure directly from any Federal department or agency such information as the Commission considers necessary to carry out this title. Upon request of the Chairperson or Vice Chairperson, the head of such department or agency shall furnish such information to the Commission, subject to applicable procedures for the handling of classified information.

(2) The Attorney General and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall provide the Commission access to all investigative files, reports, forensic analyses, and communications related to the assassination and the investigation thereof, subject to a protective order issued by the Commission to prevent public disclosure of materials that could prejudice pending criminal proceedings.

(d) SECURITY CLEARANCES.—The appropriate Federal agencies shall cooperate with the Commission in expeditiously providing to the Commission members and staff appropriate security clearances in a manner consistent with existing procedures and requirements.

(e) COORDINATION WITH PENDING CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.—

(1) The Commission shall establish procedures, in consultation with the Attorney General and the lead prosecuting authority in any pending criminal case arising from the assassination, to ensure that the Commission's proceedings do not prejudice the right of any defendant to a fair trial under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution.

(2) Such procedures shall include—

(A) advance notice to the lead prosecuting authority, not less than 30 days before any public hearing at which testimony or evidence related to the criminal case is expected to be presented;

(B) a mechanism by which the lead prosecuting authority may request, and the Commission shall consider in good faith, the deferral or closure of specific proceedings or the redaction of specific materials, upon a showing that public disclosure would create a serious risk of prejudice to a pending trial;

(C) the authority of the Commission to conduct proceedings in closed session, or to place testimony and documentary evidence under seal, when necessary to protect the integrity of pending criminal proceedings; and

(D) a requirement that the Commission, in publishing its interim or final report, shall not disclose evidence or testimony that a court of competent jurisdiction has ordered sealed or excluded from public disclosure in connection with a pending criminal proceeding.

(3) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to grant any prosecuting authority a veto over the Commission's proceedings, or to limit the Commission's authority to investigate and report on the matters described in section 10005.

(f) PUBLIC TIP LINE.—

(1) ESTABLISHMENT.—Not later than 30 days after the date on which all members of the Commission have been appointed, the Commission shall establish and maintain a secure mechanism, including a toll-free telephone line, a secure electronic submission portal, and a postal address, by which members of the public may submit information relevant to any matter within the scope of inquiry described in section 10005.

(2) ANONYMITY AND CONFIDENTIALITY.—The Commission shall permit anonymous submissions and shall, to the maximum extent permitted by law, protect the identity of any person who submits information and requests confidentiality.

(3) WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS.—Any current or former officer, employee, or contractor of the Federal Government, or of TPUSA or any affiliated entity, who submits information to the Commission in good faith shall be entitled to the protections afforded to whistleblowers under sections 2302(b)(8) and 2302(b)(9) of title 5, United States Code, and shall not be subject to retaliation, termination, or adverse action on the basis of such submission.

(4) REVIEW AND REFERRAL.—The Commission shall establish procedures for the review, authentication, and, where appropriate, investigative follow-up of submissions received under this subsection. Submissions that disclose evidence of criminal conduct outside the Commission's scope shall be referred to the appropriate Federal or State law enforcement authority.

(5) EXCLUSION FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE.—Submissions received under this subsection shall not be subject to disclosure under section 552 of title 5, United States Code (commonly known as the Freedom of Information Act), during the operation of the Commission, and the Commission's records relating to tip-line submissions shall be governed by the disposition provisions applicable to the Commission's records generally.

SEC. 10007. STAFF, COMPENSATION, AND FUNDING.

(a) DIRECTOR.—The Commission shall have a staff headed by an Executive Director appointed by a vote of the Commission.

(b) STAFF.—The Commission may, without regard to the civil service laws and regulations, appoint and fix the compensation of such other personnel as may be necessary to enable the Commission to carry out its functions, including individuals with expertise in the following areas:

(1) investigators with experience in Federal criminal or counterterrorism investigations;

(2) forensic science consultants with expertise in ballistic analysis, crime scene reconstruction, or digital forensics;

(3) attorneys with experience in Federal criminal law, national security law, or congressional investigations;

(4) analysts with experience in the financial operations of tax-exempt organizations or forensic accounting; and

(5) individuals with experience in the intelligence community, including the analysis of foreign intelligence operations, covert financial influence, or clandestine relationships involving domestic persons.

(c) COMPENSATION.—Members of the Commission shall each be entitled to receive compensation at the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay in effect for positions at level IV of the Executive Schedule for each day during which the member is engaged in the performance of the duties of the Commission.

(d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be appropriated to the Commission such sums as are necessary to carry out this title, to remain available until expended.

SEC. 10008. REPORT.

(a) INTERIM REPORT.—Not later than 270 days after the date of enactment of this title, the Commission shall submit an interim report to the President and to Congress setting forth the Commission's preliminary findings and any urgent recommendations.

(b) FINAL REPORT.—Not later than 18 months after the date of enactment of this title, the Commission shall submit a final report to the President and to Congress containing—

(1) the Commission's findings with respect to the matters described in section 10005;

(2) any recommendations for legislative, regulatory, or administrative action to—

(A) strengthen the investigation of political assassinations and political violence, including standards for forensic evidence preservation and crime scene integrity;

(B) prevent foreign financial coercion of domestic political organizations and their leaders;

(C) ensure that counterterrorism and intelligence agencies are not improperly prevented from pursuing all reasonable lines of inquiry in cases of political violence; and

(3) any dissenting views of Commission members.

(c) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.—The final report, or a declassified version thereof, shall be made available to the public not later than 60 days after its submission to Congress.

SEC. 10009. TERMINATION.

The Commission shall terminate 90 days after the date on which the final report is submitted under section 10008(b).

SEC. 10010. SEVERABILITY.

If any provision of this title, or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance, is held to be unconstitutional, the remainder of this title, and the application of the provisions of this title to any person or circumstance not directly involved in the holding of unconstitutionality, shall not be affected.

Note: LLMs were used to standardize the language in this document and formalize the text appropriate for formal introduction.